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ABSTRACT
Linguistic identity is largely a political matter and languages are flags of
allegiance. This means that the instrumental view of language is fundamen-
tally flawed. If anything, it is the pre-theoretical sense that communication is
possible or desirable in given contexts or, more technically, the presence of a
relatively stable speech community, that makes us postulate the existence of
a common language. So too, it is the unwillingness to communicate or the
unavailability of the means to do so that paves the way for the sense that
there are insuperable linguistic barriers to contend with. The immediate upshot
of this line of reasoning is that there are no such things as languages, if by
‘languages’ we mean natural objects that are “out there”, waiting to be dis-
covered, described, and catalogued by the linguist. What this means is that
there is an urgent need to foreground the issue of the politics of language.
KEY WORDS
Linguistic identity, language vs. communication, language loyalty, language
and nationalism, politics of language.
RESUMEN
La identidad lingüística es ampliamente una materia política, y las lenguas
son banderas de uniones o alianzas. Esto significa que la visión instrumental
del lenguaje es completamente fallida. De cualquier forma, es el sentido pre-
teorético que ve la comunicación como posible o deseable en determinados
contextos, o más técnicamente, la presencia de una comunidad de habla razo-
nablemente estable, que nos hace postular la existencia de una lengua común.
Así también, es la mala voluntad para comunicarse o la incapacidad de los
medios para hacerlo que prepara el camino para asumir que hay barreras lin-
güísticas involucradas en eso. El resultado final de esa forma de razonamien-
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to es que no existen tales cosas llamadas lenguas, si por ‘lenguas’ entende-
mos los objetos naturales “disponibles”, que están ahí, esperando ser descu-
biertos, descritos, y catalogados por los lingüistas. Lo que esto significa, al
final, es que hay una necesidad urgente de priorizar los resultados de las polí-
ticas del lenguaje.
PALABRAS CLAVE
Identidad lingüística, lenguaje vs. comunicación, lealtad lingüística-lengua
y nacionalismo, políticas del lenguaje.
RÉSUMÉ
L’identité linguistique est largement une question politique et les langues
sont des drapeaux d’allégeance. Cela veut dire que la vision instrumentale du
langage est fondamentalement problématique. En fait, c’est le sens pré-
théorique rendant possible ou souhaitable la communication dans des con-
textes donnés ou, plus techniquement parlant, la présence d’une communauté
linguistique relativement stable, qui nous fait postuler l’existence d’une langue
commune. De même, c’est la réticence à communiquer ou la non-disponibi-
lité des moyens pour ce faire qui ouvre la voie dans le sens qu’il n’y a pas
de barrières linguistiques unsurmontable à affronter. Le résultat immédiat de
cette ligne de raisonnement, c’est que les langues n’existent pas, si par langues
nous comprenons des objets naturels qui sont ‘au-dehors’, en attendant pour
être découverts, décrits et catalogués par le linguiste. Cela veut dire qu’il y a
un besoin urgent de mettre en relief la question de la politique du langage.
MOTS-CLÉ
Identité linguistique, langue vs. communication, loyauté linguistique,
langue et nationalisme, politique du langage.
That languages and language loyalties are frequently exploited by
the powers that be to further political ends is a fact that nobody who
has an inkling of familiarity with world history will call into question.
One does not need to go into the annals ancient history to discover
that social networks and communal bonds (and their relatively more
recent formal counterparts such as the ideas of nationhood, national-
ism, nationality etc.) were forged out of an intuitive sense that those
with whom you were able to communicate were of the same kind or
‘ilk’ as you. And the simple fact that you could understand your next-
door neighbour and make him understand what you wanted him to
know meant that you could posit a common language between the two
of you. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, the availability of a
common language is not a pre-condition for communication. If any-
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thing, it is precisely the other way around: it is the very sensation that
one is somehow able to communicate with the people around one that
prompts one to hypostatise a common language for the group. So-and-
so speaks the same language as I do; therefore I understand that person
is a mistaken way of reporting the relation between language and com-
munication. That relation is more accurately represented by the sen-
tence: So-and-so and I get along well with each other and can com-
municate to each other reasonably well; therefore we have a reason for
positing a common language between us. The existence of a language
x is predicated upon the existence of a community of speakers who
guarantee they can understand one another. (This may help explain at
least partially why theorists of language who have relatively little inter-
est in the social or communicative dimension of language prefer to talk
of language in the abstract, rather than languages in the plural and in
their individuating sense).
Languages and language loyalties have in the past often served as
powerful rallying points and they continue to do so. The ancient Greeks
for instance developed their sense of national/ethnic identity by observ-
ing how unlike the Barbarians they were. And the barbarians in turn
were so called because their speech sounded like pure gibberish to the
Greek ears. ‘They speak differently from us; so they must be a differ-
ent lot altogether’ –such is the essence of the kind of perception that
created group identities in ancient times. Of course, the ancient Greeks
had no notion of nationhood in the modern sense of the term. Neither
did they have the notion of what it was to be a foreigner. The Greek
word ξενος (xenos) is ambiguous between the senses of ‘stranger’ and
‘foreigner’, a phenomenon attested to by the common etymology of the
Portuguese words ‘estranho’ and ‘estrangeiro’ and their cognates in oth-
er Romance languages.
The concepts of nation and nationality are themselves of post-Renais-
sance origin and they only came to acquire their modern sense in the
19th century, largely in virtue of the geo-political climate in Europe
marked by the spirit of colonialism and the ethnocentric sentiments
aroused by the conquest and subjugation of alien territories and their
peoples. As Renan (1990, p. 9) put it:
Nations [in the sense in which we understand the term today] are some-
thing fairly new in history. Antiquity was unfamiliar with them; Egypt,
China and ancient Chaldea were in no way nations. They were flocks
led by a Son of the Sun or by a Son of Heaven. Neither in Egypt nor
in China were there citizens as such.
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By the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the idea of nationhood
had become closely linked with the concept of a language (as opposed
to language in its generic sense) and the whole equation was summed
up in the slogan ‘One nation, one people, one language’. Indeed so
powerful was this newly postulated association that even someone of
the intellectual calibre of Dr. Samuel Johnson fell into the trap of anachro-
nistically tracing the history of nations to the availability of common
languages. In his 1773 diary notes from a journey to the Hebrides, one
comes across the following confident assertion:
What can a nation that has not letters tell of its original? … There is no
tracing ancient nations but by language, and therefore I am always sor-
ry when language is lost, because languages are the pedigree of nations.
(Emphasis added) (Dr. Johnson, cited in Snead, 1990, p. 231).
As Snead reminds us, Johnson’s off-the-cuff remark nevertheless
bespeaks a powerful Zeitgeist and is contemporaneous with the upsurge
of a German nationalist ideology that was heralded by Herder and
Novalis, and enthusiastically joined in later on by Fichte and Schleier-
macher. No wonder that the trend inaugurated by these precursors of
nationalism in Germany would find its fullest manifestation in such ear-
ly 20th century concepts as that of Sprachgeist (the spirit of language)
(cf. Vossler, 1932).
Summing up his discussion of the political interests that were at
work in the formation of modern French identity, Greenfield (1998, p.
639) writes:
The example of France, one of the paradigmatic early nations, under-
scores the weakness of the theory which views national identity as a
reflection of an objective unity and separateness based on primordial,
‘ancestral’ ethnic characteristics, and specifically on language.
Far from being a straightforward fact of the matter, nationality is a
political banner and gives rise to such politically powerful feelings as
nationalism –which in turn is all too frequently liable to degenerate into
chauvinism and xenophobia, its flipside.
It seems reasonable to hypothesise that the idea of a language x
first emerged as a result of man’s first contact with another member of
his own species with whom his efforts to communicate turned out to
be of no avail and the new sense of self-awareness that resulted from
this surprising discovery. In other words, knowledge of the existence
of another tongue, must have been a crucial moment in the birth of
the very notion of a language as opposed to language in the abstract.
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We have already seen that it is the feeling that you are able to com-
municate with your fellows that must have led to the concept of a lan-
guage and not the other way round. In the early history of our met-
alinguistic awareness, we did not use a common language to
communicate; rather we posited a common language after noticing that
we were able to communicate reasonably well with the ones in our
daily contact –but this new sense of awareness could only have dawned
on us after we had our first contact with a speaker whom we simply
could not comprehend. The stranger/foreigner or rather his symbolic
presence is a sine qua non for the formation of language identity. Iron-
ically, no group identity could have consolidated itself without the con-
stitutive presence of the radically other. It is not only the Greek sense
of nationality or of a language of their own that needed the presence
of the alien to manifest itself as such; Greek thought or philosophy also
emerged and defined itself in opposition to ‘alien’ thought (often cari-
catured in the form of downright scepticism)– as in Platonic dialogues
where the Greek savant typically introduces the figure of the stranger/for-
eigner as the incarnation and voice of unreason, to be systematically
challenged and neutralised by dint of intense questioning by Socrates.
The very notion of a language x is thus constitutively dependent
upon knowledge that there are forms of speech other than the one is
conversant with. Furthermore, in order for there to be the notion of
language x, it is absolutely essential that we convince ourselves that
those alternative forms of speech are just as comprehensible to its
speakers as ours is to ourselves. If the Greeks had not had any con-
tact with the Barbarians, the sense of a distinct Hellenic language –and
with it, a host of other related and derivative notions as nation, cul-
ture, art and so forth– simply would not have emerged. Historians tell
us that the barbarians were initially thought of as less than humans,
but the Greek sense of self-identity crucially depended upon the per-
ception that they were just as human as the Greeks themselves, only
different. The very identity of individual languages is forged out of an
exclusionary gesture, but that identity is –true to all exclusionary strate-
gies– dependent upon the continued symbolic presence of the Other
for its permanence. (Rajagopalan, 1998a). Binary logics have long been
recognised to derive their strength from the rather paradoxical condi-
tion that absolute difference will not count as true difference.
In the remaining part of this paper, I wish to focus on the politics
of identity and how it affects questions of language loyalty and lin-
guistic self-representation. Languages are, as I shall seek to sustain, flags
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of allegiance and not simple or straightforward ‘facts of the matter’ as
linguists and other language theorists frequently take them to be.
LINGUISTICS AND THE QUESTION OF LINGUISTIC IDENTITY
It is an amazing fact about modern linguistics that the identities of
language and speakers of given languages have been treated as large-
ly unproblematic. This is not to deny that one frequently comes across
observations to the effect that the borderlines between languages and
among dialects within one and same language are often difficult to
specify with any amount of certainty. In a paper entitled ‘Some issues
on which linguists can agree’ Hudson, 1981), a paper based on an elab-
orate survey conducted some two decades or so ago among profes-
sional linguistics in the UK, one comes across the remark that “[t]here
is no clear or qualitative difference between so-called language-bound-
aries’ and ‘dialect-boundaries’” (p. 336). But, as professional linguists
embark on their routine business, they are prone to sweep underneath
the carpet such vexatious issues. Surprisingly, some writers have even
argued that “the word ‘language’ has a clear and correct use only as
an individuative term” (cf. Wilson, 1959, p. 4, quoted in Harris, 1981,
p. 13). But the standard practice amongst linguists has been to hijack
the whole discussion from an examination of individual languages to
speculation concerning language in the abstract (Rajagopalan, 1997a, b;
1998b), thus skirting a number of troublesome empirical issues about
the identity of individual languages and, more importantly, some of the
insuperable problems in coming up with reliable criteria for deciding
the boundary lines. Consider the following excerpt from Moulton that
illustrates the strategy at work:
Linguistics is the branch of learning which studies the languages of any
and all societies: how each language is constructed; how it varies
through space and changes through time; how it is related to other lan-
guages; how it is used by its speakers. Fundamental to all branches of
linguistics is the basic question: What is language? (Moulton, 1969, p. 4).
What linguistics has, in other words, systematically fought shy of
admitting is that the primary conditions for a language to be recog-
nised as such are political. A language, as it has often been remarked
with a rather dismissive shrug, is a dialect with an army and a navy.
But the full implications of such casual observations are yet to be seri-
ously countenanced by the professional linguist. Criteria such as the
THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE AND THE CONCEPT OF LINGUISTIC IDENTITY
23
possibility of mutual comprehension fail to produce satisfactory results
when we confront, on the one hand, such cases as that of Hindi-Urdu
which is practically a continuum of speech with words of Sanskrit and
Arab origins occupying the polar extremes but are considered two dis-
tinct languages for reasons of the long-standing political and religious
stand-off between India and Pakistan, and, on the other hand, cases
such as the Venetian and the Neapolitan ‘dialects’ of modern Italian or
the Mandarain or Cantonese dialects of what is vaguely referred to as
Chinese that could very well be considered different languages were it
not for the strong political interests at work in these cases. As pointed
out earlier on in this paper, linguistic identity is a function of the polit-
ical climate prevailing in given societies at specific historic moments.
Where there are tensions and unresolved political disputes between
warring factions, minor or even non-existing differences are blown up
so as to justify the existence of different and ‘mutually incomprehensi-
ble’ languages. It is not that differences between languages actually
impair communication between peoples; it is that people who do not
want to communicate across their sectarian divides are apt to ‘conjure
up’ linguistic differences where none in fact exists so as to justify their
inability (or rather, unwillingness) to communicate. What this means is
that the time-honoured, instrumental view of language, according to
which natural languages are best approached as a means to commu-
nicate with one’s peers, stands in urgent need of reformulation since it
implies that it is the availability of a common language that makes com-
munication between peoples possible and not the other way around,
as I have been at pains to press home.
When all is said and done, the truth of the matter is that linguists
are yet to come up with a purely linguistic or formal definition of a
what ‘a language’ is: as opposed to language in its generic or abstract
sense. Indeed it is no exaggeration to venture the remark that, if there
is one most embarrassing but closely guarded secret that modern lin-
guistics has had to live with, it is that, after nearly a century of intense
research and phenomenal expansion and consolidation as an academ-
ically respectable discipline, the science of language still has to have
recourse to external (non-linguistic) criteria such as geo-political con-
siderations when it comes to demarcating the exact bounds of a given
language.
The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that languages are dif-
ferent or same, depending on the political interests of those whose
opinions matter in these circumstances. There are a number of histor-
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ically attested cases that favour such a conclusion. Leaving aside such
rare cases of language being practically produced from a drawing-board
in answer to political expediency –a most telling example from recent
history being the birth of modern Hebrew, we also have such very
recent cases as the attempt by the late Croatian president Franjo Tudj-
man to deliberately Croat-ise the common Serbio-Croatian that his coun-
try shares with its erst-while partner Serbia. As Treanor (1997, p. 69)
reported: “If he is not shot or deposed, it is not impossible that Tudj-
man will make Serbian and Croatian mutually incomprehensible in 20
years’ time”. Tudjman himself did not live long enough to see his dream
translated into reality and only time will tell if the language he wished
to help create will become a reality in the years to come. Anyhow, we
have here a perfect example (albeit not yet carried through to its full
realisation) of a language being created in order to satisfy the vested
interests of a political party or a despotic national leader.
The birth of Bangla Desh in the early 1970s is another clear exam-
ple of a language –Bengali– that was politically exploited as a banner
to further the objective of independence from a nation founded on the
principle of religion, believed by its founding fathers to be strong
enough to hold together an ethnically and linguistic diverse mass of
people. So too is the ongoing struggle of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lan-
ka. Once again, the question of language became a useful weapon and
a rallying cry in the hands of a group of rebels fighting for independ-
ence and Tamil became, all of a sudden, a flag of allegiance. In point
of fact, languages are used as flags of allegiance much more often than
we ordinarily think. Other interesting examples of a minority language
resisting extinction by serving as a symbol of ethnic identity include
the case of Catalan (cf. Woolard, 1989) and that of Mexicano (Aztec)
(cf. Hill and Hill, 1986). Perhaps the best example of a language being
used as the rallying cry for the formation of a new sense of national
identity is the recent case of East Timore, where Portuguese, spoken
today by only 5 per cent of the population, has been elected as the
national language –as a clear indication to their next-door neighbours
and former colonial occupiers that they will henceforth ‘have no truck
with them’– as if they were telling their former colonial masters: “From
now on, we will be speaking a language that you do not understand;
and that is our way of letting you know that we have had enough of
you and have no further interest in communicating with you”. Like per-
sons, nations too are given to opting out of being on ‘speaking terms’
with their former ‘friends’ and current enemies.
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IDENTITY AND ITS VICISSITUDES
The post-World War II era has witnessed contacts among nations
and peoples increasing at an incredibly rapid rate and with it the pro-
gressive dismantling of barriers, be they geo-political, cultural, or even
linguistic. More and more people are becoming proficient in more than
one language, often as many as three or four languages. So much so
that multilingualism is fast becoming the norm rather than the excep-
tion in many countries. Even in countries that traditionally were looked
upon as rigorously monolingual, multilingualism has been spreading at
an impressive rate –a case in point being Great Britain which, accord-
ing to Stubbs (1986, p. 15), is today “socially multilingual”. Equally impor-
tant, though much less noticed, is the fact that many of the linguistic
transactions routinely carried out in our globalised world are actually
being carried out in mixed languages such as the Canadian ‘franglais’,
South American ‘portunhol’ and the North American ‘spanglish’– much
to the dismay of language puritans.
These recent developments have a tremendous impact on the very
identity of individual languages and also that of the speakers of those
languages, because these identities can no longer be thought of in ‘all
or nothing’ terms, contrary to the received wisdom in linguistics. Ours
is an age of Protean identities, whose hall-mark is volatility and easy
adaptability to changing circumstances. Instead of the fixed identities
that, in the ages past, privileges of birth or station in life were believed
to confer upon persons, our identities have largely become a matter of
‘self-fashioning’ (cf. Taylor, 1992).
However, what we must not lose sight of as we ponder the post-
modern phenomenon of the dissipation and rehashing of identities is
that the question of identity is fast becoming a politically loaded issue.
As Pandit (1975, p. 178) has remarked:
‘Loyalty’ to language is probably not as external to linguistics as it may
appear to be. An enormous amount of social and cultural information
is encoded in a message; verbal interaction in a speech community is
a cultural event; it reinforces sense of belonging and asserts one’s exis-
tence in a community. In this sense, identity with language is not exter-
nal, not a superposition –political or social– but an intrinsic linguistic
trait. The speaker’s attachment to his variety and his language is symp-
tomatic of the cultural load his language carries for him.
In the emergent world order marked by instability and cultural inter-
mixing at an unprecedented rate, we are constantly being asked to
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negotiate our identities in response to pressures from all sides. In the
case of our linguistic identities, the issue is further complicated by the
fact that certain languages such as English have been found to be play-
ing a hegemonic role, threatening the very survival of local and minor-
ity languages all over the world. In the countries of North, Central and
South America, many of the indigenous languages are also widely
known to be dying at an alarming rate (Rubin, 1968; Solé, 1995). If,
one the one hand, globalisation has helped foster linguistic hybridity,
it has also, on the other hand –and in what may appear to be a trend
precisely in the opposite direction– contributed to the spread of cer-
tain languages and the consequent disappearance of others (cf. Calvet,
1974; Brenzinger, 1992; Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas, 1995).
Against the backdrop sketched above, it has been my central objec-
tive in this paper to plead that there is an urgent need to foreground
the issue of language politics. As a preliminary step, I advance the idea
that languages are best viewed as flags of allegiance rather than straight-
forward facts of the matter (cf. Rajagopalan, Forthcoming; In prepara-
tion). This means, among other things, that such familiar phenomena
as code-switching are best approached as politically motivated and symp-
tomatic of language-related tensions that are operative in given social
set-ups (Canagarajah, 1995; Siegel, 1995) and also that such time-hon-
oured concepts as ‘mother-tongue’ and ‘native speakerhood’ are to be
approached as political rather than linguistic issues. Finally, languages
themselves (as opposed to ‘language’ in its generic or abstract sense)
reveal themselves, on close examination, to be political entities rather
than simply linguistic facts.
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